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A cosmopolitan politics of loyalty 
While focusing on the thought of Charles Taylor the question whether 
the politics of loyalty can be part of a transcendental structure for 
society is discussed in this article. Classical patriotism, for instance, 
involves loyalty to public institutions and laws to enhance self-rule. In 
the twentieth century, however, classical patriotism became fused with 
nationalism (i.e. loyalty to culture), resulting in many instances in 
human suffering. Part of the explanation for this derailment is to be 
found in the Taylorian concept of the hypertrophy of autonomous 
freedom. The argument developed in this article links up with trends in 
liberalism and Taylor’s own reasoning that hypertrophy can be curbed 
within a transcendental structure for society (i.e. a cosmopolitan 
politics of loyalty). However, in the liberalist trends (and also in 
Taylor’s thought) tension exists between such a structure and the 
perception that loyalty politics is a mere particularism. As alternative I 
propose engagement between the cosmopolitan perspective and the 
various loyalties, with the latter a transcendental principle that needs 
to be applied in collaboration with other principles. 
Opsomming 
’n Kosmopolitiese politiek van lojaliteit 
Terwyl gefokus word op die denke van Charles Taylor word die vraag 
of die politiek van lojaliteit deel kan wees van ’n universele 
normstruktuur in hierdie artikel bespreek. Klassieke patriotisme behels 
byvoorbeeld die lojaliteit aan openbare instellings en wette ter wille 
van selfregering. In die twintigste eeu het patriotisme egter vermeng 
geraak met nasionalisme (d.i. lojaliteit aan ’n spesifieke kultuur) met 
menslike lyding in baie gevalle as die resultaat. Vir ’n verklaring van 
hierdie ontsporing gebruik ek Taylor se konsep van die hipertrofie van 
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outonome vryheid. Ek sluit aan by tendense in die liberalisme asook 
Taylor se eie denke en beredeneer die stelling dat hierdie hipertrofie 
ingeperk kan word binne ’n transendentale struktuur vir die 
samelewing (d.i. kosmopolitiese lojaliteitspolitiek). In sowel die 
liberalisme as in Taylor se denke is daar egter spanning tussen so ’n 
struktuur en die persepsie dat lojaliteitspolitiek bloot ’n vorm van 
partikularisme is. As alternatief stel ek ’n verbondenheid tussen ’n 
kosmopolitiese perspektief en die verskillende lojaliteite voor. Die 
verskillende lojaliteite is self ook ’n transendentale beginsel wat 
toegepas moet word in samewerking met ander beginsels. 
1. Introduction 
For cosmopolitans the idea of taking patriotism and nationalism 
seriously is an outrage, because of the bigoted, jingoistic and bloody 
history of twentieth-century nationalism. Cosmopolitans operate with 
the perception that this kind of politics is only interested in the 
survival, interest and power of the own group against the cos-
mopolitan orientation with its openness to all people. 
In order to develop a less declinatory view towards loyalty, I intend 
to focus on and reinterpret crucial aspects of the republican ideas of 
the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor. Taylor seems to have 
affinity for both a politics of loyalty and a cosmopolitan stance. It will 
be argued that his attempt to accommodate these seemingly 
opposites is the only alternative. Kal (2001:186), however, is of the 
opinion that a tension between cosmopolitanism and the auto-
nomism associated with loyalty manifests itself inherently to Taylor’s 
thought. If this conclusion is true, it implies that Taylor is stuck in 
some form and degree of dualism and that the contours of a 
cosmopolitan loyalty should go beyond Taylor. 
I will thus embark on a search to connect the cosmopolitan stance 
and the politics of loyalty in a more integral way. Directing this 
attempt is a hunch that the dilemma between the exclusivity of 
loyalism and the sterility of cosmopolitanism is due to an ab-
solutisation of either a legitimate loyalist morality or an impotent use 
of the transcendental order for society suggested by the concept 
cosmopolis1. This attempt to connect a cosmopolitan stance and the 
                                          
1 Toulmin (1992:67-68) traces the meaning of cosmopolis to the ancient Greek 
distinction between the order of nature (cosmos) over which humans have a 
mere marginal command and the order of society, which is fully under human 
control. Cosmopolis represented to ancient Greeks the dream of an overall 
harmony and fusion between these two orders. Stoics especially used the word 
in the sense of order implying that “reason” binds all things together. “The 
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politics of loyalty will be linked with a diagnosis that sees a fully 
secularised and autonomist freedom as the root-cause of both 
exclusivist loyalism and sterile non-commitment2. This autonomism 
represses the idea of a societal structure that provides a just (not 
repressed but also no over-emphasised) place and function to 
loyalties. 
I will argue that we should look for an integral view in the idea of 
particular loyalties that receives a legitimate and necessary place in 
a structure for society. 
2. Patriotism and nationalism 
A first important step is to define the politics of loyalty. Widely used 
definitions can be obtained from college handbooks. Baradat 
(2003:58-60), for instance regards patriotism as an important part of 
nationalism. For Baradat patriotism implies the emotional or 
devotional acts accompaning nationalism – acts that express a 
loyalty and commitment to the nation-state. Nationalism, on the 
other hand, is seen by him as the actual theoretical or worldview-
related content. Nationalism is the ideology (i.e. worldview and 
vision of a better life) of the modern nation-state. According to 
Baradat the main (and mainly unacceptable) features of this 
ideology are the following:  
• its exclusive focus on the national group as the principal political 
unit;  
• the demand that the national group be served by the state; 
• the assumption that politics determine the identity of the human 
being (family for instance should take second place); 
• that the identity of some national group should be the ultimate 
unifying factor – an assumption that leads to the subordination of 
                                                                                                                           
practical idea that human affairs are influenced by, and proceed in step with 
heavenly affairs, changes into the philosophical idea that the structure of Nature 
reinforces a rational Social Order”. My positive allusion to “cosmopolis” is not to 
an order bound by “reason” but to a creational structure that can possibly give 
positive direction to the diversity and contingency in which we find ourselves. 
2 Kal (2001:182-183) for instance diagnoses the common virus in both non-
commitment and jingoism as the modernist motive of autonomist freedom. In the 
case of jingoism a particular nation becomes the project for a limitless 
consciousness of freedom and power. Autonomism is also behind this kind of 
cosmopolitanism that promises freedom from confinement within a particular 
community. 
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all other identities, values and interests to those of this national 
group. 
Baradat‘s (2003:46-47) definition of nation is in terms of ethnicity or 
culture rather than citizenship. Several nations can thus be citizens 
of the same state, while a single nation can be divided among 
several states. This description implies that a national group needs 
not necessarily be a political concept that demands a strong and 
formal connection between nation and state. It also means that one 
should distinguish between two kinds of social groups, that is, 
nations and states. I will therefore assume that a legitimate 
nationalism refers to loyalty towards the ethnic, culture or language 
group within the bounds of general moral norms that control all 
human relations (i.e. a cosmopolitan nationalism). It is of course a 
possible and indeed a popular practice to fuse nation and citizenry, 
which makes the national group the main political unit with the 
unacceptable features mentioned above of reducing human identity 
to that of a political being; of reducing a political unit to a single 
national group and thus to suppress all other identities. 
My difference with Baradat concerns his description of patriotism as 
the emotional and activist side of nationalism. However, patriotism 
should rather be related to the state than to nationalism. Patriotism 
has indeed an emotional, even devotional, as well as an activist 
component. But patriotism also includes a worldview-related – and 
even theoretical- explanation and justification of the object (the 
state) of patriotic emotions and actions. 
For ancient people as well as for people of early modernity, 
patriotism was a strong identification with public institutions through 
which collective self-rule is possible – a meaning which to my mind 
still highlights the proper sense of the word patriotism. Behind this 
meaning the idea lies that a person lives a “higher life” when he is 
part of a “self-managing people”. “Self-management became 
possible, because men were willing to die for the patria, for the laws, 
because they devoted themselves to res publica” (Taylor, 1993:41)3. 
Taylor (1993:41, 42, 45, 46) interprets nationalism as the modern 
manifestation of this old ideal of collective self-rule and loyalty to the 
                                          
3 Cf. also Viroli (1995:19-20) who emphasises that the ancient concept of 
patriotism had two important nuances of meaning: Firstly, it implies an 
identification of patria with res publica, common liberty and common good and 
secondly, it assumes that citizens owe their country a love similar to the 
affection of relatives – a love that expresses itself in acts of service and care. 
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laws of the polis. Nationalism is the demand for “self-determination”, 
despite the modern erosion of local and religious communities. 
Identification with and self-rule through some group is fundamental 
for moderns. Thus, if people are fundamentally dependent on group 
membership and previous identifications are no longer viable, the 
obvious alternative is that of “the speaking animal, namely, 
nationality based on language”. 
In the light of my earlier distinctions between state and nation, as 
well as between patriotism and nationalism, Taylor clearly conflates 
these loyalties and social functions too readily.4 Patriotism should be 
seen as loyalty to the state and democratic processes while the 
loyalty of nationalism is to a community defined by a common 
culture, ethnicity or language. Aggressive versions of nationalism 
usually try to “invade” the state in order to make it the primary 
instrument for maintaining and establishing loyalty to a single 
culture, ethnicity or language. This emphasis assigns a totalitarian 
role to some ethnic, cultural or language identity and the state’s 
primary task, that is, to administer justice, is not focused on. This 
derailment, however, does not annihilate a legitimate communal 
loyalty to specific cultures and languages that are also important 
contributing sources for making us the persons we are. The 
mentioned derailment also does not exempt the state from any 
responsibility to protect these sources within its borders. 
Patriotism as a loyalty and commitment to the “common freedom” of 
all the citizens of a particular state can of course also assume 
totalitarian form. In this case the particular agenda of the state (i.e. 
usually of the government of that state), as the embodiment of the 
“common freedom”, becomes a goal that overrides all other 
communal funtions. This overruling can take place for instance when 
the state tries to set and control the agenda and culture of all 
communities within its borders – from language groups, to sports 
associations to religious communities. Behind this kind of derailment 
of the object of patriotism is what Baradat (2003:51) calls “statism”. 
According to this view, the “state is the most powerful form of human 
                                          
4 This intuitive perception is also shared by Viroli (1995:8-9) who argues that 
nationalism assumes themes like cultural or ethnic unity and purity, while these 
themes receive no or very little attention in republican patriotism. Although Viroli 
admits that republicans also think that we have a moral obligation towards 
country because we owe our country our life, education, language and liberty, 
the main obligation towards country is “to protect the common liberty”. He 
therefore thinks we should “think in terms of two languages, not a single 
language unfolding and changing over the centuries”. 
Koers 69(3) 2004:449-472 453 
A cosmopolitan politics of loyalty  
organisation” which means that the state is not within the bounds of 
any normal form of moral restraint, because it sees itself as greater 
and above all other forms of community as well as in total control of 
the individual. 
The point that needs to be stressed is that nationalism and 
patriotism should deal with different modes of loyalty: nationalism 
deals with culture and language, while patriotism deals with loyalty 
to the state. It is important to keep these two modes apart, although 
they will necessarily converge in the formation of human beings’ 
identities. The reason for keeping them apart is because the 
invasion of the one by the other is a first indication that the invader is 
on its way to become a malignant totalitarianism. It is therefore 
important to reject all forms of fusion of nationalism and patriotism 
and to insist on a structure for society that allocates a legitimate 
place to both patriotism and nationalism. An important feature of 
such a legitimate place is to show loyalty only to the proper task of a 
particular kind of community. If a state for instance wants to be more 
than only the administrator of justice, citizens should refuse to be 
loyal to such a totalitarian enterprise. 
3. Nationalism and modernism 
Although Taylor’s uncritical conflation of nationalism and patriotism 
can not be accepted, his account provides important insights into the 
relationship between this fusion and modern society. 
Viroli (1995:10-11) is of the opinion that many contemporary political 
philosophers regard patriotism (and definitely also nationalism) as a 
hopelessly obsolete vestige of antiquity. Modern people want 
“freedom”, perceived as existing only in the pleasures of private life. 
This attitude, Taylor argues, is not at all an accurate account of 
modern society. He argues that the nature of modern society 
provides the context for the fusion of nationalism and patriotism. For 
this aspect Taylor (1997:32-33) refers to Ernest Gellner’s analysis, 
which characterises modern societies as economies that need to be 
serviced and managed by the state. Because these economies grow 
and change, they require a population that is occupationally and 
geographically mobile and homogeneous. This requirement implies 
that a standard language, enforced by the state, must replace all 
local dialects. Homogeneity as the “inescapable imperative of 
modernity” eventually appears on the surface as nationalism. 
Taylor (1997:34, 42) postulates that Gellner’s account is incomplete. 
Some people assimilate without much protest and become part of a 
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new nationalism, because they do not want to be economically 
disadvantaged, but others put up a fight. Faced with the “distasteful 
prospect” of homogenisation, they attempt to create a new 
polity/economy where their own language will be the official one. 
The point Taylor wants to stress is that nationalist struggles are not 
simply the result of a regression to premodern tribal identities, but 
are the product of a situation of rivalry that is “quintessentially 
modern in its structure and stakes”. 
It can nevertheless still be argued that although the context of 
nationalistic struggles is modern, the nationalist sentiment itself is 
primeval. Taylor (1997:43-45), however, argues that even the 
sentiment is modern. In many instances the rise of nationalism 
evolves from the refusal of the elite. Whoever does not accept a 
market-industrial economy, a bureaucratically organised state and 
popular rule will irredeemably fall behind in the power stakes. A 
successful adaptation to modernity is one where people find 
resources in their traditional culture to take on these new practices. 
There is thus in the process of change a “call to difference” felt by 
the modernising élite. Important is that the “call to difference” is 
experienced by the élite because of their sense of dignity. For them 
an imputation of inferiority against the stronger culture will remain 
until they adapt successfully. Dignity thus gives nationalism its 
emotive power. 
Critics of Taylor point out that one cannot reduce the origin of a 
justified nationalism to only the emotion of dignity experienced by 
the élite group of a minority. Kymlicka (1997:60-63) thinks for 
instance that the reason why endangered cultures put up a fight, is 
quite simple: members of all cultures desire to live and work in their 
own culture. Kymlicka admits that this is a fair desire. He points out 
that the latter judgement is not only that of communitarians or 
conservatives, but also of liberals – he mentions Rawls, Humboldt, 
Mill, Berlin, Dworkin and Raz. Feinberg (1997:69-72) states that 
besides the emotional dimension (dignity), economic causes for 
nationalism are also significant (which Taylor also points out in the 
case of those who become part of a broader homogeneous 
nationalism). In many cases the élite are responding not to insults 
aimed at them, but to the desperate political and economic 
conditions of their compatriots. 
Feinberg nevertheless admits that nationalism is not always simply 
sparked off by economic causes. In fact, we need to understand 
nationalism comprehensively and the mechanism of its creation can 
probably not be reduced to only dignity, or only economical factors, 
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or only the nature of the modern state. We can probably agree that 
these factors, like aspirations, are justified and constitute a 
moderate nationalism. Nevertheless a very important link exists 
between these modern views and an aggressive fusion between 
nationalism and patriotism that needs further exploration. This link is 
obvious in the modernist notion of autonomism as yet another cause 
of current nationalism. 
To understand this link, we should look at the difference between 
liberal and illiberal nationalism. An illiberal nationalism, according to 
Kymlicka (1997:63), is one that aims not only to maintain the own 
culture, but also to oppress dissidents or racial minorities within that 
culture and to dominate non-members outside the group. These 
aims will lead to campaigns of ethnic cleansing or prohibitions on the 
use of minority languages. The difference between liberal and 
illiberal nationalism needs to be explained. In other words, what are 
the causes of a malignant nationalism? 
Taylor (1997:48) implicitly meets the critique of Kymlicka and 
Feinberg when he argues that the recognition of dignity accounts for 
the liberal nationalism of the élite, but not for nationalism as an 
illiberal popular movement. Nationalism (in the majority of cases) 
becomes a popular movement, simply because of the physical fears 
of a minority. This movement develops into a situation of distrust 
and hatred towards other groups with whom the minority shares a 
space. Each community harbours the suspicion that the other group 
initially mobilised itself and that the aggression of the own group is 
secondary and defensive in nature. In the end all groups are in the 
grip of a powerful nationalism “hell-bent on its own form of ethnically 
pure ‘self-determination’”. This motivation has little to do with 
threatened dignity, but everything with a sense of physical threat, of 
fear of displacement and extermination by a hostile other. This 
explanation can takes us some distance towards an understanding 
of malignant nationalisms. 
Taylor (1997:52-53) argues that nationalisms differ in what they 
want to take over. In liberal nationalisms, part of what is seen as the 
desirable modernity are the liberal values of rights and equal 
citizenship for all civilians, regardless of their differences. Tensions 
in this liberal nationalism exist between universal values and 
particular interests. But, says Taylor, these tensions can be 
managed for “there is no question of sacrificing universality on the 
altar of nation”. Different to this approach are the nationalisms that 
do not include liberal values. In this respect the nation is defined 
purely ethnically and even racially and there is nothing in this 
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nationalism to curb this exclusivism. It is significant that Taylor 
mentions that in this instance, modernity does not help at all – it 
rather aggravates things. When a sovereign national will is the 
aspiration and it becomes the source of all right, nothing will stand 
against it; the outsider has no place in this rule of popular 
sovereignty. In fact, outsiders are usually seen as contenders for the 
self-determination of the nation. If such a defensive nationalism 
takes a hold, the scene is ready for ethnic cleansing. 
4. Modernist freedom 
The latter remark about the connection between popular self-
determination and a malignant nationalism, suggests that the 
context of modernist ideas of self-rule has a strong role in the origin 
of an illiberal nationalism. Taylor, however, does not elaborate 
directly on self-rule as a reason for the derailment of modern 
nationalism. Such an elaboration, however, can be done in terms of 
Taylor’s own explanation of the modern moral order as a context for 
nationalism. 
Taylor (1997:38; 2004b:9-11) depicts the current context for 
nationalism as similar to Benedict Anderson’s explanation of modern 
states as “imagined communities”. An important feature of modern 
social imaginary that Taylor borrows from Anderson, is that social 
entities are no longer visualised as grounded in something higher 
and other than “common action in secular time”. In the premodern 
state a kingdom was seen to be based on the “Great Chain of 
Being” or on “an original law” – a view that originated from the 
perception that the state is “action-transcendent”. Contract theory 
that regards people as coming together out of a state of nature and 
demanding self-determination, has changed all these perceptions. 
According to Taylor (1993:46-47, 68-72) the collective form of 
autonomous freedom did not develop as a first choice for 
“emancipated humanism”. The first phase (Hobbes and Locke) of 
modernity emphasised “man as an atomic subject” that only uses 
politics as an instrument. Autonomous freedom originated as a 
rejection of ancient views, which saw humans as “part of some 
cosmic order”. The modern “free subject” is seen as someone “who 
follows an internal purpose and who owes no a priori allegiance to a 
pre-existing order but gives it only to structures that were created by 
his or her own consent”. Accompanying this view was a notion of 
“efficacy,” that is, the idea that a free subject should control himself 
and nature in order to attain his purposes. In this early version of 
modern freedom, the “need for a horizon of meaning”, was ignored. 
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The latter requirement was again brought to the fore by the 
Romantic phase, during which it was argued that for a person to 
discover his purposes in himself, he needs a horizon of meaning 
given to him. It is once again important that this horizon is provided 
by some group or tradition. According to Taylor, Romanticism 
implies a “deepening” of emancipation. Phase one emphasises 
individual autonomy “to the point where the necessity of social 
mediation has been lost”, but in the second phase social “institutions 
and practices have been of crucial importance”. 
Taylor regards the motive of autonomy or self-determination as 
forming part of the context of nationalism. Taylor is not without 
critique of this motive. He (Taylor, 1993:59-61; 2004b:1) mentions 
that a “hypertrophy” of modernist motives can take place – a 
process which he defines as “becoming too much what we have 
been”; the very things that define modernity – freedom, equality, 
control over nature, democratic self-rule – are carried beyond 
feasible limits and turn against us. He mentions two versions of a 
possible hypertrophic form of freedom, both appropriate to modern 
loyalties. The first is the idea that the autonomous subject finds his 
purposes in himself. This perspective is a rejection of the premodern 
idea that human beings are set in a broader cosmic order that 
determines our purposes (i.e. secularisation). The hypertrophic form 
of modern freedom from a cosmic order undermines itself by 
“destroying meaning”. The other fear is that the exaltation of 
individual freedom ends up eroding the loyalties to the community 
(like nationalism and patriotism) – loyalties which any society needs 
to survive (i.e. “a sense of impending social dissolution”). 
Taylor (1993:62-63) argues that we should prevent the hypertrophy 
of modern motives (like autonomous freedom) by developing them 
in an “authentic form”. This view represents a strategy of reform; it 
implies to “rescue them in their integrity, as against the distortions 
and perversions that have developed in modern history”. To counter 
the hypertrophy of individual autonomy Taylor, in communitarian 
mode, emphasises autonomous self-creation and self-rule through 
the institutions of society, which provide reasons for being loyal to 
these institutions. Taylor (1993:122-123, 132) regards institutions 
like families, churches and the state as identity-forming institutions. 
A person’s identity assumes a “normative view of life”, because it 
includes a vision of what is good or bad. It is important to emphasise 
that for the communitarian in Taylor the identity-forming institutions 
are “not only the point of application of a morality defined elsewhere; 
rather, it is the primary environment in which this morality gets 
elaborated”. 
458 Koers 69(3) 2004:449-472 
 Michael Heyns 
Taylor is nevertheless, as previously mentioned, aware of the 
hypertrophy of the autonomy of nations and states, which ends in a 
malignant nationalism or statism with no regard for modern liberal 
values. The hypertrophy of modern self-creative nationalism or 
patriotism can turn the republic from an ideal of collective freedom 
into an instrument of collective terror. 
The question is of course whether Taylor pursues any formula to 
avert (reform) the hypertrophy of collective freedom. Very clear is his 
suggestion that forms of collective freedom can and should be the 
antidote against the hypertrophy of individual freedom and the 
meaninglessness of freedom from a cosmic order. Because of his 
moderate communitarian inclination, he will presumably also agree 
that individual freedom should be a barrier against the hypertrophy 
of collective freedom. Unfortunately, an important dimension is 
lacking: although he points out that the modern collapse of the idea 
of a cosmic order is one of the main causes of a loss of meaning 
and direction to earthly life, he does not get beyond the 
reinstatement of horizons of meaning created by various 
communities, which in its hypertrophic mode, is part of the problem. 
Modern reflection on this issue should (but usually do not explicitly) 
make room for meaning that transcends the human source, which 
will give a boundary and direction to both individual and collective 
autonomous freedom. 
5. Atomism and the politics of loyalty 
Modern autonomous freedom first appeared in an atomised cloak. 
This version is far from extinct and still a major alternative to jingoist 
nationalism and statist patriotism. The usual atomistic limitation to 
statism and jingoism is the idea that the state and culture is merely 
an instrument for individuals and should not be an object of 
affection. This instrumentalisation, however, breeds non-commit-
ment, which may lead in its hypertrophic form to an undoing of 
collective liberty and to an impotence of the proper task of the state. 
In the light of problems of citizen disengagement like low voting 
percentages in established democracies, this non-commitment 
should be a major cause of concern and indeed important to 
explore. 
Atomism’s effect of non-commitment on patriotism recently surfaced 
in Primoratz’s (2002:447-449) argument that we cannot see 
patriotism as a duty. He suggests that we should consider our 
compatriots as “a mere aggregate of individuals”. One of the strong 
arguments for patriotism is that one owes gratitude to one’s country 
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because it gives life, education, language and liberty. But, rejoins 
Primoratz, gratitude is something that belongs to individual relations, 
which means gratitude to one’s country is “an abbreviated way of 
referring to gratitude to certain specific persons who have acted 
within and on behalf of these large entities”. Primoratz (2002:451-
452) justifies his opposition to patriotism (as a form of loyalty to a 
societal institution) with the perspective that groups are mere 
associations, which can be used as instruments to obtain some 
other goal. This view means that the unity of an association is 
external, justified only by cold, rational calculation. 
The ontology behind this view is the atomist outlook which regards 
the rights of the individual as ultimate point of departure.5 When a 
person enters into a communal relation with other humans, his rights 
are in no way affected, because the purpose of entering society is 
merely to protect these rights. In fact, society assumes that 
everybody should gain from the co-operation. This point of departure 
leads to the view that society is a mere instrument for the freedom 
and autonomy of the individual. The problem with this 
instrumentalisation of relations is that it “is antithetical to any strong 
commitment to a community”6 and on an intimate level, relationships 
are subservient to the “self-realisation” of the partners (Taylor, 
1985b:187-188, 193; 1991a:43-44). 
Instrumentalist politics manifests itself, if we use Taylor’s 
(1991b:164-165, 177-180) jargon, in a “procedural liberalism”. 
Proceduralism prescribes neutrality on the substance of the good 
life. Every individual must choose his own conception of the good. 
The task of the state is only to arbitrate between the demands of 
these conceptions with the correct “procedures of decision”. The 
task of citizens is merely to pressurise the government to deliver on 
this procedural intervention. This point of view also means that 
participation in the governing process is not very important, as long 
as the government fulfils its task.  
A hypertrophy of atomistic freedom thus exists; that is, the emphasis 
on the freedom of the individual from social pressures becomes a 
source of disengagement from the body politic, political impotence 
and ultimately a return of despotism. Taylor (1991a:112-119; 
                                          
5 Cf. also Sandel (1984:85-86) and MacIntyre (1995:219-220) for this com-
munitarian analysis of atomism. 
6 This is also Sandel’s (1984:89-91) critique. 
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1989:505, 508; 1993:94-97; 1995:281-283)7 argues that although 
procedural government generates a lot of political activity, it will 
mainly be channelled into judicial conflicts. Connected with this 
activity is what he calls “interest or advocacy politics”. The strategy 
of these politics is that of lobbying, mobilising mass opinion and 
selective intervention in election campaigns. These two strategies 
make it harder to settle important issues, because they narrow the 
chances of debate and compromise. The underlying tone is 
adversarial and prescribes that a person should get his rights, 
whatever the consequences for the whole.8 This stance reflects and 
entrenches the kind of fragmentation where citizens feel excluded 
from the political process and find it hard to identify with their 
political society. Non-identification reinforces the experience of 
political defencelessness against the “leviathan state”. The condition 
for successful participation is a strong identification with the fate of 
the community. This is patriotism, which, according to Taylor, is “the 
elusive factor that is thought to make a participatory regime viable 
while its absence beyond a certain point makes despotism 
inevitable”. The logic behind this view is, according to Taylor, that 
only such a strong loyalty to society could motivate citizens to freely 
take up the “burdens of a free regime”, while the absence of this 
loyalty would require that “even the lesser burdens of a despotism 
be imposed by force”. 
Taylor identifies a hypertrophy of liberal individual freedom when 
individuals disengage from the political process because of an 
atomist ontology and instrumentalist strategy and in the end become 
the victims of a new despotism. He thus suggests that the 
alternative to this disengagement between a specific state and the 
universal rights of individual citizens will be to see social institutions 
as an essential part of the mechanism that introduces autonomous 
freedom (and thus also individual rights) and that loyalty to these 
institutions are important. This is a valid point, but probably not the 
whole story. One could ask whether the compromising style of 
                                          
7 Sandel (1984:91-95) gives the same analysis and critique as Taylor on this 
point. 
8 Kymlicka (1989:84-90) does not seem to get the point, viz. that to engage in 
judicial conflict merely to ensure individual rights makes compromise concerning 
a common goal difficult. This view is underscored when he says that “it doesn’t 
follow that decisions are not after all made by electorates but by bureaucrats” if 
individuals veto majority decisions with rights politics. Lemmens (1994:121) on 
the other hand, agrees with Taylor that it remains questionable whether only the 
guarantee of rights will have any binding identification with the general interest. 
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collective self-rule will in some cases not enlarge the danger of a 
lesser emphasis on the civil liberties (the universal values of justice 
and right) of individual citizens. Once again the issue of a third 
source for political direction (beside individual autonomy and 
collective self-rule), that is, a set of transcendental norms, should 
enter the debate. 
Indeed, the secular hostility towards transcendental norms is not 
necessarily all that there is to modernist liberalism. Shklar (1991:29-
30, 34) makes the fear of cruelty “the basic norm” of modern political 
liberalism9, and this, she adds, is a “universal and especially 
cosmopolitan claim”.10 Against the historicist and ethnocentric ideas 
that there are no “generally valid social prohibitions or rules”, she 
argues that this “absolute relativism” is “too complacent and too 
ready to forget the horrors of our world to be credible”. Shklar 
(1991:26-27, 29-30) nevertheless does not want too much universal 
content in liberalism. In what she calls the “liberalism of natural 
rights” of Locke, she rejects “the constant fulfilment of an ideal pre-
established normative order, be it nature’s or God’s”. It is rather hard 
to see how she (and for that matter, mature modernity as described 
by Taylor) will be able to avoid some notion of order, because she 
does recognise that in her “liberalism of fear” the avoidance of 
cruelty is “simply a first principle ... on which liberalism can be built”. 
6. Structure and the politics of loyalty 
Patriotism and nationalism can be important alternatives to the 
sterility of an instrumentalist non-commitment. One should 
nevertheless take into account that these loyalties itself can go 
through a process of hypertrophy of the freedom it promotes and 
end in an exclusivism and collectivist terror. There should thus exist 
a relation between loyalty and goods where the two complement 
and not exclude one another. The hypertrophy of modernist 
autonomy can be traced back to the idea that freedom consists of 
being free from a structure for society. However, the mere notion of 
hypertrophy assumes in itself the possibility of a reformation of 
                                          
9 This is a definition of liberalism echoed by none other than Richard Rorty 
(1993:xv, 74), despite his fierce opposition to any “Platonic” notions of order. 
10 From the cosmopolitan corner Martha Nussbaum (2004:2) indeed alludes to 
something outside the human domain when she argues that jingoism actually 
subverts the values that hold a nation together, because it pledges allegiance to 
“a colorful idol” in place of “the substantive universal values of justice and right”. 
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freedom in which space for a connection between structure and 
freedom does exist. 
This possibility has already been suggested in liberalism’s defence 
of civil liberties. Freedom is, on the one hand, something that 
humans achieve, but it is, on the other hand, also sensed that there 
are some universal conditions attached to it. Taylor suggests for 
instance that equality and subjective rights are important for the 
manifestation of freedom. He (Taylor, 1993:72-73) thinks that 
equality and human rights are “features of modern society that have 
played a vital part in developing and sustaining our sense of 
ourselves as free agents”. A dimension of the “free subject’s relation 
to society”, is according to Taylor, “that one must be the subject of 
rights”; as “a free subject, one is owed respect for one’s rights”. 
Nevertheless, besides these suggestions of the importance of 
structural principles in modernist liberty, he emphasises that 
freedom is also influenced by the “ability to effect one’s purposes” 
and be able “to alter the world” – which he calls “efficacy”. This 
ability to self-create has an individual dimension, but he emphasises 
that modernity has also taken up the ancient republican tradition 
“that only citizens are full persons capable of acting” which means 
the “fact that we govern ourselves is an extremely important part of 
our dignity as free subjects”. 
Taylor’s emphasis of concepts like equality and rights as well as the 
idea of autonomy provides a more universal motivation for the 
politics of loyalty than that of MacIntyre (1995:210-212) who 
emphasises loyalty to a particular community and not the universal 
virtues that it should serve. This suppression of universality in 
patriotism assumes a disconnection between particularity and 
universality, which is, ironically, akin to that of Primoratz’s liberal 
atomism. Primoratz (2002:451) prefers atomistic associations, which 
he admits are more fleeting and superficial but, he thinks, has as 
goal a more universal order of rules and values (like “fair play” and 
the “welfare of humanity”) than that of the particularity of communal 
relations (like that of patriotism) where the well-being and survival of 
a specific and historically contingent community is foremost. 
Taylor rejects the disengaging universalism of atomism and the 
disengaging particularism of communitarianism when, in his (Taylor, 
2004a:1-2) reaction to Nussbaum’s argument for a universalist 
cosmopolitanism, he says that to propose a cosmopolitan identity as 
an alternative to patriotism is a mistake, because “we have no 
choice but to be cosmopolitans and patriots”. One of the reasons for 
this, he says, is that people mobilise around common identities. In 
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our choice of being loyal to some identity, it is of course important 
that such identity be “open and hospitable to cosmopolitan 
solidarities”. The latter seems to be universal norms, which means 
that to be both a cosmopolitan and a patriot is to adhere to a 
patriotism that is connected to, curbed and directed by universal 
norms. 
Taylor reasons from the modern idea of freedom, which tends to 
disconnect freedom from any extra-human structure. Within this 
broad modern paradigm, he chooses to put more emphasis on the 
idea of a communal horizon of meaning and collective self-rule. This 
emphasis causes some tension in his reflections on the idea of 
individual freedom and the natural rights of the individual. This 
tension, however, does not cause him to make a strong choice for a 
pure communitarian politics of loyalty. Primoratz (2002:444-446, 
450-451) would for instance call Taylor’s patriotism a “value-based 
patriotism”, because it comprises (partly) of a concern for one’s 
country and compatriots, because this country embodies certain 
universal goods. Primoratz says that in this patriotism, it is the goods 
themselves and not the country that are the objects of commitment. 
However, he thinks that in a “true patriotism” the particular 
component is essential and that a “value-based” patriotism is “a 
mere pragmatic device for assigning to individuals some of their 
universal duties”. For the true (non-value-based) patriot this is to 
miss the essential particularity of patriotism. Primoratz’s analysis 
suggests a fundamental dualism and thus disengagement in 
Taylor’s vision on the relation between patriotism and universal 
goods.11  
An atomistic liberal viewpoint, which emphasises the rights of the 
individual, usually leaves little space for the idea of patriotism. This 
emphasis on rights with the resultant exclusion of the idea of 
patriotism is brought about because this viewpoint sees patriotism, 
among other things, as a manifestation of particularism and 
collectivism, which undermines the universality of norms for 
individual existence. An extreme communitarianism, ironically, also 
                                          
11 Kal (2001:182-186) also points out that Taylor’s affinity for modernism means he 
allows for a free-floating individualist autonomy that undermines loyalty to 
community. Kal thinks that human beings who find themselves inside the 
individualist freedom ideal, will experience a limitless restlessness that will get to 
a rest only in a comprehensive engagement. Something like this can be 
experienced in the universal ideals of liberal democracy. The nature of this 
ideology (its emphasis on individual freedom) will cause the individual not to 
keep his engagements. 
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subscribes to this disengagement between the universal and the 
particular by choosing for a patriotism that does not link with any 
universal goods. This tension and disengagement between goods 
and communal loyalty is inherent to Taylor’s concept of a “value-
based” patriotism. Nevertheless, the idea of a value-based 
patriotism emphasises that if patriotism wants to be a necessity for 
the functioning of a modernist state, it can do this only in close 
connection with universal goods. 
7. A structural role for loyalty 
A politics of loyalty will always be viewed with suspicion as long as it 
is given a purely particularist character. This perception can change 
if the universal side of something like patriotism is also recognised; 
that is, if patriotism is seen as a manifestation of the moral relation 
between citizens and between citizens and the state. 
Taylor indeed moves towards such recognition of the universality of 
patriotism. He (Taylor, 1991b:167-171; 1995:138-139, 141) de-
scribes the republican attitude, which he proposes as an alternative 
to procedural liberalism, as the ability to see political matters as a 
concern “for us” where this “us” are bound together by patriotism. He 
gives the following example to explain the difference with atomism: if 
my neighbour and I discuss the weather, it is a matter “for us”. 
Before we started the discussion, it was only a matter for him and for 
me separately. When something becomes an “undecomposable” 
matter “for us”, it becomes a “common good”. Examples of such 
common goods are relations of friendships and “citizen liberty” or 
“participatory self-rule”.12 This description hints at patriotism as a 
condition for self-rule. It assumes a normative meaning when he 
(Taylor, 1991b:172-173) states that “citizen identification with a 
common good” is an important condition for a “non-despotic regime”. 
Liberalism should have a place for a “common good, and hence 
patriotism, hence that it can be viable as a free society”. 
Taylor goes further than merely the idea that patriotism is needed for 
freedom and adds the equality of society as an important goal of 
patriotism.13 Taylor (2004a:1) remarks that “we cannot do without 
                                          
12 Vandevelde (1997:126) thinks that it is possible to add the “classical law state” 
(“de klassieke rechtstaat”) and the idea of the “welfare state” (“de klassieke 
welvaartsstaat”) to the list of common goods. 
13 Rorty (1998:3, 15) agrees when he says that “national pride is to countries what 
self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement”. He 
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patriotism in the modern world”, because “the societies that we are 
striving to create – free, democratic, willing to some degree to share 
equally – require strong identification on the part of their citizens”. 
He has in mind the notion that a “democracy is highly vulnerable to 
the alienation which arises from deep inequalities, and the sense of 
neglect and indifference that easily arises among abandoned 
minorities”. This situation demands policies “with redistributive 
effect” and it is precisely these policies that would “require a high 
degree of mutual commitment”. It is significant that these de-
scriptions of the demand for patriotism is not motivated by a mere 
obsession to safeguard the interest of a particular community, but 
that patriotism becomes an important vehicle for the realisation of 
freedom and equality in general. One could argue that patriotism 
becomes in Taylor’s thought a universal good in itself – a good 
needed for the realisation of goods like freedom and equality. 
Taylor deals with the concept autonomy or self-rule in a com-
plementary way. Self-rule becomes a universal good on which other 
important goods depend. He (Taylor, 1993:41; 1995:257-258, 273, 
287) argues that a liberal but also republican society should be 
characterised by three goods, namely freedom, collective self-rule14 
(republican rule) and a rule of right founded on equality. 
Individualistic liberalism focuses one-sidedly only on freedom, he 
argues. However, if collective self-rule dwindles, the individual 
freedom it protects will also disappear. 
From the liberal corner, Primoratz (2002:452-453) accepts to some 
degree the communitarian argument that an individual becomes and 
remains a moral agent when he is informed and sustained as such 
by his community. The community therefore deserves patriotic 
allegiance.15 But, Primoratz also says that this does not necessarily 
                                                                                                                           
thinks a debate and consensus on reforms is necessary if citizens want to 
“achieve” their country. 
14 According to the original definition of Berlin (1969:121-123, 131) what Taylor 
calls “freedom” is actually “negative freedom” which sets limits to the control 
external agencies can have over some individual and, one can add, some 
individual community. What Taylor sees as collective self-rule is a version of 
“positive freedom”, which suggests the empowering abilities a person or 
community have to effect its own destiny. 
15 The same is true of Kymlicka (1992:223), a liberal, who acknowledges that 
liberals “still tend to take the existence of a tolerant and diverse culture for 
granted, as something which naturally arises and sustains itself”. He therefore 
agrees that communitarians are correct to “insist that a culture of freedom is a 
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imply “lifelong unswerving loyalty to the particular morality his 
community imparted in him”, because the community should also 
provide him with the capacity to engage in moral thinking of his own. 
For Primoratz this is an argument not to see patriotism as a moral 
duty. It is as if he wants to argue that at some point the individual 
can and should be on his own and become the creator of his own 
liberty. 
Taylor (1985b:206, 209, 309-310) warns, in communitarian mood, 
that atomists tend to assume that institutions like the rule of law, 
equal respect and common deliberation are simply “something 
given”. But, argues Taylor, these goods took a long time to develop 
and they might disappear if not nurtured. Taylor (1985b:194-195, 
197-198; 1991c:163-164)16 adds that the republican principle is not 
simply to support the government of the day, but rather a certain 
kind of society; that is an “autonomy-supporting environment”. He 
thinks that if a person has the capacity to have moral and religious 
convictions, society not only has the obligation to protect her right to 
have certain convictions, but should also help her develop into an 
agent capable of “authentic conviction”, because “we are dealing 
with a characteristically human capacity which can be aborted or 
distorted or underdeveloped or inhibited”. Furthermore, “this com-
mits us to an obligation to belong”. If these capacities can only 
develop in a society of a certain kind, we ought to belong to and 
sustain this kind of society. 
Taylor emphatically makes the point that patriotism and collective 
self-rule can be universal conditions for the unfolding and 
sustainability of goods like individual autonomy and equality. The 
idea of a value-based patriotism or liberal nationalism, however, 
underscores the notion that the relationship also goes the other way: 
patriotism and self-rule will not disclose themselves in a benign and 
normative way if they do not keep an eye on the directional influence 
of other universals like justice and equality. Atomists (like Primoratz) 
are of course correct to resist the terror of a community that 
enforces simply any ethos on its individual members. Terror is not 
                                                                                                                           
historical achievement”. He therefore also argues for a “culture which supports 
self-determination”. 
16 Taylor says this in reaction to Nickel (1989:543-544), who points out that there 
can be “considerable dissonance between the social and legal orders” of a 
country. Nickel gives the example of a Chilean during the Pinochet era that may 
have felt a patriotic identification with Chilean society, but that this implies no 
duty of obedience to the laws of the Pinochet regime. 
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only or even mainly due to the suffocation of the autonomy of 
individuals by some collectivity, but more so because of a 
suppression of universal moral goods, like freedom, equality and 
justice. This oppression can also be the work of some individual 
tyrant or small group of tyrants. The important diagnosis is not only 
about some one or some people that oppress, but also what they 
oppress and promote. Goods like freedom and justice are not only 
the product of a particular historical development, but also involve a 
sense that they are the manifestation of a more universal order that 
regulates the particular historical development. Thus, one can surely 
argue that if goods are not nurtured by particular communities and if 
they are not actively pursued by individuals, they will die. Equally, if 
the historical course of communities and individuals are not con-
trolled by universal ideas, they will sink into the misery of despotism 
and injustice. 
8. Concluding perspective 
The main focus of this article is a search for a cosmopolitan politics 
of loyalty; this approach implies an attempt to reconcile the loyalty to 
communal spheres with a transcendental structure for society. The 
leading theoretical statement is that the cosmopolitan ideal demands 
that loyalty to family, state, nation and so on, should not transgress 
the functional and structural boundaries of these communal spheres, 
for this is the beginning of the road to totalitarianism. 
In the twentieth century a fusion of patriotism and nationalism took 
place, which is indeed a first indication of either a totalitarian state or 
a totalitarian nation. A totalitarian state for instance claims control 
over also the cultural, ethnic and lingual identities of the nation(s) 
within its boundaries and thus prescribe what the cultural loyalties of 
its citizens should be. The reverse of this is when a national group 
tries to hijack the functioning of and loyalty to the state in order to 
safeguard and promote some ethnic, cultural or lingual identity. 
From a structural perspective it is therefore important to limit the 
loyalty to any communal sphere to the legitimate function of that 
sphere. It is thus necessary to distinguish between loyalty to the 
state (patriotism) and loyalty to the nation (i.e. ethnic, cultural or 
lingual group) and to insist that a legitimate patriotism implies loyalty 
to a state that only perform its legitimate task (i.e. to administer 
justice), while a legitimate nationalism implies loyalty to a nation that 
only aims to empower its adherents to be creators of culture. 
The demands of modernist conditions lure many states into an 
attempt to homogenise its citizenry culturally and to ask for a fusion 
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between nationalism and patriotism. Structurally this attempt implies 
a state overstepping its boundaries by playing the main determining 
role in the identity of its nations. Reaction to this situation may follow 
in many instances and the end result usually is an aggressive ethnic 
nationalism, characterised by some national grouping aspiring to 
hijack state power in order to undermine the homogenisation. This 
kind of nationalism also represents a derailment and the attempt to 
avoid it, implies the inspiration for the notion of a liberal nationalism. 
According to this kind of nationalism, the aspirations of the nation 
are tolerated as long as they fall within the bounds of the liberal 
values of freedom and equality. This boundary is made difficult by 
the modernist ideal of autonomy which, in its extreme form, denies 
any transcendental values that regulate the communal relations of 
people. However, any liberal outlook attempting to function without 
the idea of a transcendental order for society, should be questioned. 
Kymlicka (1997:64) for instance thinks that a liberal nationalism 
arises only within a country with long-established liberal institutions. 
Any nationalist movement that seeks to impose illiberal elements in 
a population will not acquire any popular support. This claim, 
however, leaves some historical tendencies unexplained. After the 
9/11 attack on the USA, Americans, probably inspired by some form 
of nationalism17, became among other things unduly obsessed with 
their national security18. To invade two countries (Afghanistan and 
Iraq) which, although not intended, caused the deaths of thousands 
more civilians than 9/11, are no longer within the bounds of a liberal 
outlook. We should remember that America claims a long tradition of 
liberalism. Moreover, Germany, before the Nazis, was not without 
liberal influence. Further back, the excesses of British imperialism 
were also not to be reconciled with the liberalism that was part of the 
British tradition. 
                                          
17 Baradat (2003:59, 61) calls the USA “a very nationalistic society” and he sees 
this nationalism expressed in “a wave of patriotism” that “recently rushed over 
the United States in the wake of the terrorist attack on New York’s twin towers 
and the Pentagon building in Washington”. To this he adds that the United 
States has also used nationalism to justify its economic and military involvement 
in the Middle East. 
18 This obsession with their own security is not new to Americans. In what he calls 
“the ideology of guaranteed security”, Goudzwaard (1984:61-63) points to a 
similar obsession that caused the madness of the arms-race between the USA 
and the USSR during the Cold War. 
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The point is that liberal democratic processes do not seem to be the 
ultimate guarantee that a derailment of public sentiment will not take 
place or that a population’s sense of justice and morality is 
incorruptable. What is seen as a liberal tradition should definitely 
include a consciousness that a basic structure and prescription on 
how people should live together, is not something that can be 
changed by the whims of the electorate and rulers. It is important to 
take note that atomistic liberalism lacks a strong identification with 
the body politic from the side of citizens. If there is no such loyalty 
(patriotism), democracy (and all the rights and liberties that go with 
it) will not succeed. This is, however, not the only element for a 
democracy to be successful. In the context of a modernist outlook, 
important motives that push in the direction of an illiberal menace 
can be indicated: Extreme disconnection from a transcendental 
structure and the influence of this disconnection on the idea of 
human autonomy can erode the idea that collective self-rule should 
take place within general limits of moral conduct among people. A 
community that sees itself as the sole creator of its own liberty, gives 
no guarantees that it will not decide to emancipate its own members 
to the detriment of non-members or to force its members to be free 
according to some imaginary general will. 
It is possible to get stuck within a tension between, on the one side, 
the idea that a community is the originator of its own freedom and 
therefore needs the strong loyalty of its citizens and, on the other 
side, that liberty are structured by the natural rights of its citizens. An 
understanding that will go a long way to soften this tension, would 
be a concept of loyalty as in itself a universal good that commands 
citizens to live in a moral way toward fellow citizens and the state 
itself, by adhering to goods like justice and equality. It is also clear 
that loyalty that goes beyond this support role for other goods and 
becomes an end in itself by only mobilising the power and interest of 
a particular communal sphere, has lost its moral import. It is 
therefore important to make a last suggestion: Normative concepts 
like loyalty, self-rule, equality, freedom and justice should be seen 
as conditions for one another. This means that normative concepts 
should be in an ongoing interaction – an interaction of mostly 
support, also sometimes of conflict, but never to lose contact with 
one another. This idea of interaction means that we can never, in a 
nominalistic mode, try to take leave of the idea of a transcendental 
structure in which all these goods should be recognised on an equal 
footing as valid for the way a nation organises itself. 
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